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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia
Felix Heiduk, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Birmingham, United  Kingdom
Indonesia provides a fruitful case study of differences between radicalization processes in liberal and authoritarian regimes. Political Science hereby tends to 
emphasize regime type as the determinant of Islamist political strategy (radical, militant or moderate) and therefore as the main explanatory factor for rad-
icalization processes. Although this is true of the role of Islamists in various Middle Eastern countries, where electoral participation has moderated political 
programs and strategies, it is of little relevance to Indonesia. The democratic opening in 1998 provided Islamists with new opportunities to participate in elec-
toral politics, and even become co-opted by formally “secular” forces, but at the same time opened up spaces for militant, radical Islamist groups. Whereas 
radical Islam faced severe state repression under Suharto’s New Order, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islamists, 
expressed in operational terms as a parallelism of repression and cooptation. This article tries to make sense of the relationship between the post-auth-
oritarian state and radical Islam in Indonesia by transcending the institution-centered understanding of the role of Islam through an examination of the con-
figurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of radical Islam within Indonesia’s new experiment with democracy.
More than 85 percent of Indonesia’s population of more 
than 230 million are Muslim, making it the largest Muslim-
majority nation in the world. Hence there are nearly as 
many people of Islamic faith living in Indonesia as there 
are in the entire Arab world. Since the fall of the auth-
oritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has made sig-
nificant strides toward democracy. Its democratization 
featured a general overhaul and liberalization of the politi-
cal system, including the establishment of a multiparty sys-
tem, freedom of the press, and the first free and fair 
elections since 1956. Indonesia’s democratization fur-
thermore encompassed the decentralization of a highly 
centralized political system in which political power was to 
a large degree concentrated in the hands of Suharto and 
channeled through his vast patronage network. The transi-
tion to democracy also saw attempts to reform the power-
ful military that had backed Suharto’s New Order and had 
been the main instrument to repress any form of opposi-
tion movement in the country, as well as attempts to re-
form the economic system once dubbed “Suharto’s crony 
capitalism.”
The latter included, amongst other issues, the fight against 
endemic corruption and tackling the disastrous effects of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the national economy. 
Most reviews of Indonesia’s transition to democracy have 
so far been very positive. It is widely acknowledged that, for 
the time being, Indonesia does not seem to be in danger of 
falling back into authoritarian structures. Many researchers 
(Rieffel 2004, Qodari 2005, Mujani and Liddle 2010), as 
well as international institutions such as the World Bank or 
the UN, describe the free, fair, and peaceful elections of 
1999, 2004, and 2009 as historic landmarks for the country. 
The country has seen several changes of government, and 
legislatures and courts have gained formal independence 
from central government. Indonesians also enjoy extensive 
political freedoms, while countless civil society organiz-
ations and other pressure groups try to exercise some sort 
of a “watchdog function” over elected governments on the 
national and local level (Nyman 2006). Along these lines, 
Indonesia possesses many attributes of a consolidated 
democratic political system and has remained largely stable 
during the post-Suharto era. Such observations first of all 
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contradict culturalist theories of Muslim exceptionalism:1 
although a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia did not 
descend into theocracy after the fall of Suharto. Despite 
being the country with the largest Muslim population, Is-
lamist parties never gained sufficient voter support to chal-
lenge the secular state. Neither the 2004 nor the 2009 
national elections featured any significant increase in votes 
for parties with Islamist agendas. The most important issue 
for voters throughout the 2009 election was the economy, 
and there has been little evidence that factors such as re-
ligion or ethnicity had any significant influence on voting 
behavior (Mujani and Liddle 2010, 37).
Indonesia therefore makes an interesting case study, as cul-
turalist theories on the relationship between Islam and 
democracy claim that the two are incompatible because the 
former does not provide for a separation of church and 
state and does not allow secular law to be translated into 
divine law. This is not to say that Indonesians see no place 
for religion in politics. In 2010, 89 percent of respondents 
to a PEW Global Attitudes survey said that Islam played a 
large role in politics in Indonesia, and that Islam’s in-
fluence in politics is positive (91 percent). However, in the 
same survey a 65 percent majority of Indonesians believed 
that democracy was preferable to any other kind of govern-
ment, whilst only 12 percent said that in some circum-
stances a non-democratic government can be preferable.2 
Therefore it seems safe to state that the majority of the 
population, as well as the country’s political elite, regard 
the idea of an Islamic state as counterproductive (Fealy 
2004). The country has remained on course toward democ-
racy, and many (mostly foreign) observers reiterate the im-
portance of a democratic Indonesia as a potential role 
model for the whole Muslim world, demonstrating the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy (Kingsbury 2010; 
Hughes 2004). That is not to say that the country has not 
experienced a radicalization amongst certain Islamic actors 
or the development of a militant fringe committed to wage 
jihad on what it perceives to be opponents of the establish-
ment of an Islamic state. The emergence of radical Islamist 
groups has consequently sparked concerns amongst foreign 
observers and Indonesians alike. Asked about Islamic ex-
tremism in Indonesia, 42 percent of respondents said they 
were either very concerned or somewhat concerned, while 
42 percent said they saw a struggle between modernizers 
and Islamic fundamentalists. Of the 42 percent who saw a 
struggle, 54 percent identified with modernizing forces and 
33 percent with fundamentalists.3 However, these figures 
are not to be equated with support for Islamist militancy. 
In fact support for Islamist militancy has decreased. While 
in 2003 59 percent of all respondents expressed support for 
Osama bin Laden, the figure dropped to 26 percent in 
2011.4 Similarly, in 2009 65 percent stated that suicide 
bombings can never be justified.5
The existing theoretical literature finds two divergent ex-
planations for the small role radical Islam has played in In-
donesia’s recent history (Hamayotsu 2010). One basically 
turns the aforementioned general culturalist argument 
against itself and attributes the success of Indonesia’s de-
mocratization process despite a Muslim-majority popu-
lation to the specific characteristics of Indonesian Islam. 
According to this argument, the different ways in which 
Islam was blended with earlier, largely animist, religious be-
liefs and traditions weakened the rigidity of Middle Eastern 
interpretations of Islam. This in turn led to the establish-
1 The theory of “Muslim exceptionalism” is back-
ed by the rather general claims of authors such as 
Huntington (1997, 1991), Lipset (1994), or Gellner 
(1994), who see Islam as responsible for the absence 
of democracy or, where democracy has been intro-
duced to a Muslim state, as responsible at least for 
the aforementioned challenges of democratic con-
solidation. What underlies this is the belief in a 
“unique relationship between religion and politics 
in Islam that precludes the separation of the relig-
ious and political spheres” (Ayoob 2006, 2). In other 
words, political thought and action in the Muslim 
world are mainly driven by religious goals, or at least 
by religious convictions.
2 “Egypt, Democracy and Islam,” PEW Global At-
titudes Project, PEW Research Center, January 31, 
2011, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-pro-
tests-democracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-
extremism.
3 “Egypt, Democracy and Islam,” PEW Global At-
titudes Project, PEW Research Center, January 31, 
2011, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-pro-
tests-democracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-
extremism.
4 “Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among 
Muslim Publics in Recent Years,” PEW Global Atti-
tudes Project, PEW Research Center, May 2, 2011, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/05/02/osama-bin-
laden-largely-discredited-among-muslim-publics-
in-recent-years/.
5 “Little Support for Terrorism Among Muslim 
Americans,” PEW Global Attitudes Project, PEW 
Research Center, December 17, 2009, http://pewre-
search.org/pubs/1445/little-support-for-terrorism- 
among-muslim-americans.
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ment of moderate, liberal traditions of Islam in Indonesia 
since its arrival in the thirteenth century. Hence the pecu-
liarly moderate form of Islam developed over the centuries 
all over the Indonesian archipelago leaves little room for 
fundamentalist interpretations and is thus compatible with 
democratic, liberal forms of government (Geertz 1960).
The other argument emphasizes the existence of demo-
cratic institutions since the fall of Suharto. In this interpre-
tation, the establishment of free and fair elections, freedom 
of the press, and a multiparty system has helped to margi-
nalize radicalism by giving radicals an opportunity for 
political participation. Here, the regime type seems to de-
termine the strategies and politics of the Islamists. If we 
consider the experiences of various Middle Eastern coun-
tries with radical Islamist movements, this hypothesis 
seems to make sense as political liberalization allowed the 
participation of radical Islamists. Given the opportunity to 
participate, however, Islamists were ready to adjust former 
radical positions and in the end became increasingly mod-
erate (Nasr 2005). In a very simplified form, the main ar-
gument would be that inclusion through participation 
leads to moderation, exclusion through repression leads to 
radicalization (Hafez 2003).
How far does this argument carry us with regard to the case 
of Indonesia? In Indonesia, democratic, or at least reform-
oriented Islamists did – amongst other groups – in fact play 
a vital part in ousting Suharto. They took part in the re-
formasi movement demanding free and fair elections and 
press freedom, and founded democratic parties and civil so-
ciety organizations. But as well as opening up a space for 
moderate Islamists to participate in electoral politics, the 
transition to democracy also made room for a more radical 
fringe of political Islam. Taking these processes into account 
it seems that political liberalization has been a double-
edged sword: on the one hand it fostered the emergence of 
moderate Islamic civil society organizations and Islamic 
parties; yet on the other hand violent Islamist groups 
emerged after the fall of Suharto. The ambiguous role Is-
lamists have played in post-Suharto Indonesia thus calls 
into question the assumption that political liberalization 
fosters a moderation of Islamist actors. Post-authoritarian 
Indonesia not only witnessed moderate Islamists playing a 
reform-oriented role within electoral politics, but also saw 
Islamist militants conduct an armed struggle for the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state. Thus, the assumed correlation 
between democracy and a moderation of radical Islamists 
seems to be highly ambiguous: the existence of democratic 
institutions alone obviously cannot be directly equated with 
a moderation of Islamist forces. As we have observed, both 
processes – radicalization/militancy and moderation – fol-
lowed Indonesia’s transition to democracy.
I therefore argue that the “liberalization = moderation” hy-
pothesis does not adequately describe the realities in post-
Suharto Indonesia. While political Islam in Suharto’s New 
Order stood in stark opposition to the state, and con-
sequently even moderate Islamists faced intense state re-
pression, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship 
between state and political Islam, which expresses itself in 
operational terms through a parallelism of policies of re-
pression and co-optation.
In order to make sense of the ambiguous relationship be-
tween the post-authoritarian state and political Islam in In-
donesia, we need to go beyond an institution-centered 
understanding of democratization processes and look at 
the configurations of social forces that have determined the 
shape, scope, and practices of Indonesia’s transition to 
democracy. For this we need to link the resurgence of 
political Islam in Indonesia with a critical examination of 
the power politics behind the democratic institutions that 
evolved after 1998. I will begin by providing some insights 
into the historical relationship between Islam and politics 
in Indonesia, before moving on to explore the resurgence 
of political Islam after the ousting of Suharto, and examine 
the specifics and limitations of Indonesia’s transition to 
democracy. I will conclude with an outlook on the pros-
pects and perils of Islamism in Indonesia more than ten 
years after the reformasi.
1. Indonesian Islam and Politics in Historical Perspective 
Taking into account Marx’s observation that religion serves 
as the “sigh of the oppressed creature,” it is no surprise 
that Islam as a political ideology came to Indonesia during 
the colonial era. During (and beyond) Indonesia’s struggle 
for independence from the colonial rule of the Dutch, 
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Islam competed for mass support with two other ideologi-
cal currents: nationalism and communism. Unlike to the 
history of nationalism, the history of political Islam in In-
donesia is one “crowded with failure” (Fealy 2005, 161). 
Fealy identifies three main periods. The first, from 1949 
until 1959, was shaped by independence and the country’s 
first experiments with democracy, which were char-
acterized by relatively free political competition between 
parties and the first free and fair elections. The second 
period, from 1959 until 1998, was in turn shaped by a fal-
tering of the flirtation with democracy. This period con-
sisted of decades of authoritarianism, first under Sukarno’s 
“guided democracy” (1959–1965) and then under Suhar-
to’s “New Order” (ordre baru). After the initial experiment 
with democracy in the 1950s, both regimes that followed 
placed tight restrictions on political Islam. The third peri-
od, which began following Suharto’s ousting in 1998 and 
continues through the present, is also shaped by the past 
(Fealy 2005, Hadiz 2011).
After Indonesia became independent from Dutch colonial 
rule in 1949, the main line of political conflict between Is-
lamist and more secular forces concerned the question of 
whether Indonesia should become an Islamic state. The Is-
lamists favored the inclusion of the sharia in the Indonesian 
constitution and the establishment of a Negara Islam In-
donesia (Islamic State of Indonesia). More secular forces, 
amongst them Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, feared 
that an Islamic constitution could lead to secessionist as-
pirations among the then mainly Christian eastern prov-
inces of the archipelago and ultimately cause the break-up 
of the young nation. These fears tipped the scales in favor of 
a constitution that excluded notions of an Islamic state. The 
majority of Islamic actors, although deeply disappointed by 
Indonesia’s “secular” constitution, took comfort in the pros-
pect that the Islamic parties would, if united, certainly win 
Indonesia’s first elections and would then change the con-
stitution. A minority of Islamists even began local uprisings 
with the goal of establishing an Islamic state (Negara Islam) 
through military force. The so-called Darul Islam movement 
(House of Islam) eventually managed to establish Islamic 
rule in parts of Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi, but these were 
eventually crushed by the central government after a dec-
ade-long civil war (Dahm 2007, 203).
The first free elections in 1956 brought bitter defeat for the Is-
lamist parties. While the dream of a politically unified Islam 
had been dashed by various political splits between 1949 and 
1956, hopes of electoral victory were disappointed too when 
the Islamic parties gained only 43.1 percent of the votes. 
While from 1956 Islamic parties participated in coalition gov-
ernments under Sukarno, their political influence was often 
overshadowed by the secular nationalism of Sukarno and the 
PKI (Partai Kommunis Indonesia, the Communist Party of In-
donesia). When Suharto came to power after a military coup 
in 1965, his first move was directed against the powerful PKI. 
With the help of Islamic militias and the military, an esti-
mated half a million PKI members were killed. Despite the 
close involvement of many Islamists with the military during 
the transition from Sukarno’s “guided democracy” to Suhar-
to’s New Order, the demise of Sukarno and the PKI did not 
mean greater influence over state power for political Islam. 
On the contrary political Islam, as the only potential source of 
opposition to Suharto, was quickly marginalized (Hadiz 2011, 
18). This marginalization included requiring Islamic groups 
to conform to the state philosophy, restricting the use of Is-
lamic symbols and language, and limiting the number of Is-
lamic parties. In 1973, all Islamic parties were forced to merge 
and form the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United 
Development Party). The very name of the party demon-
strates the nearly complete marginalization of political Islam 
under the first decades of the New Order, as it no longer bore 
any direct reference to Islam. Under the New Order no inde-
pendent power centers existed outside the state apparatus, 
which is why Benedict Anderson describes the ordre baru as 
the victory of the state vis-à-vis society (1990).
Intensifying state repression forced many of the more rad-
ical Islamist activists into exile; amongst them most notably 
many of those who were later involved in the creation of Je-
maah Islamiyah. As a result of the heavy state repression 
political Islam had very little political influence for decades 
in Indonesia (Baswedan 2004, 671). The Suharto regime 
legitimized the authoritarian politics of the New Order 
through state-led developmental strategies. New Order de-
livering continued high economic growth rates and rising 
living standards, for which, in the mindset of the architects 
of the New Order, political stability was a precondition. 
The latter was achieved through the backing of the state se-
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curity apparatus and massive support from the West. For 
the West, Suharto was an effective ally to help prevent In-
donesia from shifting to either communism or Islamic 
theocracy. As economic growth rates began to decline from 
the 1980s onwards, Suharto – aware that his secular power 
base had started to crumble – began a turn toward Islam in 
order to legitimize his authoritarian regime.
What followed was a whole bundle of policies that led to a 
gradual Islamization of Indonesian society: the appoint-
ment of pious Muslims to leading government and military 
positions, increased support for Islamic teachings in schools 
and universities, the lifting of the ban on girls wearing the 
headscarf in school, and an expansion of the authority of 
sharia courts, to name only a few. Along with the new pol-
icies came the foundation of the IMCI (Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intel-
lectuals) as well as the establishment of an Islamic bank and 
insurance agency. Suharto’s public persona changed in line 
with these developments: he took part in the hajj pil-
grimage to Mecca and in general showed more public com-
mitment to Islam than in previous years. During the late 
1990s, Suharto even briefly tried to co-opt Islamist forces as 
a tool against the emerging pro-democratic reformasi 
movement. Within a decade, Islam transitioned from being 
at the margins of the state to occupying a favored status 
within the regime (Singh 2004) – although one must ac-
knowledge that this turn mainly comprised a drive for an 
increase in personal piety among the citizens of Indonesia. 
Political Islam, still largely defined in opposition to the 
authoritarian and corrupt regime of the New Order, was 
facing state repression like any other opposition group.6
The Islamization of the late New Order, which still in-
fluences the trajectories of Indonesian Islam to this day, 
must be understood against a variety of interconnected fac-
tors. Perhaps most importantly, tensions between the re-
gime and the military, which had been one of the main 
pillars of regime stability, drove Suharto to look for other 
supporters and sources of legitimacy. In addition, mounting 
divisions within the regime were accompanied by the rapid 
growth of the traditionally very pious middle classes, caused 
by the economic boom of the 1970s and 1980s. The middle 
classes embraced Suharto’s gradual renunciation of the 
military insofar as “they welcomed the opportunity to gain 
access to senior government positions” (Fealy 2005, 164).
Hence, on the one hand, the Islamization of Indonesia 
owes, much to a rising middle class seeking moral orien-
tation and identity in a rapidly changing sociopolitical and 
economic environment. For many, Islam became a refer-
ence point, a reliable and consistent element of identifica-
tion within an ever-changing, modernizing order (Hefner 
2005). On the other hand, the rise of Islam is to some ex-
tent intertwined with the Islamization policies im-
plemented by the Suharto regime itself. This is what Ruf 
(2002, 51) calls an “irony” of the aforementioned macro-
political developments: that “secular” regimes in the Mus-
lim world, such as the Suharto regime in Indonesia, 
became promoters of the Islamization process by pushing 
for the implementation of a wide variety of Islamic policies 
in an attempt to regain or strengthen their own legitimacy 
and control rising political support for Islam (see also: 
Hasan 2007a, 88). It is against this background that the 
often ambiguous relationship between Islam and politics in 
post-Suharto Indonesia must be analyzed.
While one cannot fail to notice the growing influence of 
conservative (Wahabi) interpretations of Islam through 
charitable foundations and other Islamic organizations 
6 One example of this is the “Tanjung Priok mass-
acre.” On September 12, 1984, following the arrests 
of several individuals accused of giving anti-govern-
ment sermons at Tanjung Priok Rawa Badak 
Mosque, an anti-government demonstration was 
held in the Tanjung Priok harbor area of north Jak-
arta. The participants were protesting against a law 
requiring all organizations to adopt the sole ideo-
logy of the state, the Pancasila.They were encircled 
by security forces, who opened fire on the demon-
strators. Survivors claimed that several hundred 
people were killed during the incident.
7 While the impact of 9/11 and its aftermath is not 
part of this analysis, it needs to be noted that the 
ramifications of 9/11, the “war on terror,” and the 
invasion of Iraq certainly had implications for the 
resurgence of political Islam in post-Suharto In-
donesia. Von der Mehden (2008) argues that these 
events reinforced a sense of Islamic identity amongst 
Indonesia’s Muslims while at the same time amplify-
ing perceptions of a clash between the “West” and 
the “Muslim world.” Furthermore, 9/11 and its after-
math facilitated the radicalization of elements within 
Indonesia’s Muslim community and increased sup-
port for the goals and actions of these radicalized el-
ements. The general public and the majority of the 
political elites, while initially condemning the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, reacted very negatively to the “war 
on terror” and the invasion of Iraq, leading to an in-
creased negative perception of the United States and 
its allies amongst Indonesia’s Muslims.
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based in the Arab world from the 1970s onward (Bubalo 
and Fealy 2005), various forms of Islamic militancy and the 
struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state can be 
traced back to the pre-independence era (Sidel 2006; Hadiz 
2011). Above all else, the range of historical events de-
scribed here questions the prominent image of Indonesian 
Islam as being inherently tolerant and moderate. However 
biased such an image has been, it most certainly reflects the 
fact that Islam as a political force was for decades marginal-
ized or even repressed under Suharto’s New Order. With 
the ousting of Suharto this was to change drastically.
2. The Resurgence of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia 
The end of the New Order led to the opening of the politi-
cal sphere for a great variety of new political actors.7 Mod-
erate Muslim intellectuals were active in the pro-democratic 
reform movements that took to the streets in 1997 and early 
1998 and demanded Suharto’s resignation. While playing a 
vital role in the immediate events leading to the downfall of 
Suharto, the “movement for a democratic Muslim politics 
in Indonesia” (Hefner 2005, 274) was soon effectively mar-
ginalized by a rising conservative (and often militant) spec-
trum of Islamist actors, ranging from transnational terrorist 
networks like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Islamist militias to 
legal Islamist political parties and civil society groups. The 
radical fringe of political Islam has displayed a heterogen-
eous array of organizational structures, goals, applied strat-
egies, and relationships with the state.
The opening of the political system was closely followed by 
an outbreak of inter-communal violence between Muslims 
and Christians, the establishment of Islamist militia 
groups, and attacks by the Jemaah Islamiyah terror net-
work on Christian churches (2000), nightclubs in Bali 
(2002 and 2005), the Australian embassy (2004), and the 
Marriott Hotel (2003, 2009) (Mapes 2005). Shortly after 
the ousting of Suharto, nominally Christian paramilitaries 
sprung up, attacking what happened to be nominally Mus-
lim communities in Poso (Sulawesi), Central Kalimantan, 
and the Moluccas. While the roots of these conflicts – all of 
which had been effectively suppressed by the iron rule of 
Suharto – were to be found in competition over political 
and economic power, local leaders effectively mobilized 
support amongst “their” constituencies by portraying the 
conflicts in religious rather than in political/economic 
terms (van Klinken 2007). Sectarian violence between 
Christians and Muslims in the three aforementioned prov-
inces has cost more than twelve thousand lives since the fall 
of Suharto. The outbreak of sectarian violence in 
1998–1999, paralleled by the intensification of long-run-
ning separatist conflicts in the provinces of Aceh, West 
Papua, and East Timor, led many analysts to conclude that 
a break-up of Indonesia (often termed “Balkanization”) 
could very well be underway (Wanandi 2002; Mally 2003).
Even more worryingly, the escalation of violence in Ambon 
(Moluccas) owed a great deal to the establishment and de-
ployment of Islamist militia groups such as the currently 
disbanded Laskar Jihad (Jihad militia), which was re-
portedly heavily involved in the deadly conflict between 
Muslims and Christians on the Moluccas. Besides the Las-
kar Jihad, the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Defenders of 
Islam Front), another Islamist militia, made headlines by 
patrolling the streets of Jakarta and other cities in order to 
prevent what their members perceived as “vice” (e.g., 
massage parlors, nightclubs, the selling of “pornographic” 
literature, etc.). Furthermore, the FPI conducted raids dur-
ing Ramadan, targeting businesses and individuals who 
were deemed disrespectful to the holy month. In April of 
2006 the organization attacked the newly founded office of 
the Indonesian edition of Playboy, as well as organized 
gatherings and demonstrations in 2007 against the newly 
established left-wing Papernas party, which it acused of 
spreading communist ideals (Sabarini 2007b). In 2010 and 
2011 the number of religiously instigated assaults by Is-
lamic militias such as the FPI increased significantly. For 
example, in September 2010 alone more than thirty attacks 
on Christian churches took place, twelve more than during 
the whole of 2009. As Kimura notes, the government re-
sponse was “lukewarm, if not provocative” (2010, 190). On 
the day before the FPI launched an attack on one Christian 
church, its representatives met with Jakarta’s governor and 
police chief to discuss cooperation between FPI and the 
police to better ensure “law enforcement support” during 
Ramadan.
What is more, the activities of various militia groups were 
often backed by state officials. Laskar Jihad, for example, 
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was reportedly armed and trained by members of the In-
donesian military (Hasan 2006). According to cables from 
the U.S. embassy in Jakarta published by Wikileaks, sources 
within the Indonesian security forces had such close ties to 
the FPI that they were able to warn the U.S. embassy of an 
FPI attack hours before it actually took place. One cable 
states that a member of Indonesia’s BIN intelligence agency 
managed to provide the U.S. embassy with “advance notice 
of FPI’s hostile intent hours prior to the February 19 van-
dalism of the Embassy.” The cable also states that “National 
Police Chief Sutanto had provided some funds to FPI” 
prior to the attack, but cut off funding after the attack. The 
FPI is described as an “attack dog,” and thus as a “useful 
tool” for the police, “that could spare the security forces 
from criticism for human rights violations.”8 The Indone-
sian police described the claims made in the cable as false 
and untrue.9
Islamist militias were also involved in a number of attacks 
on Ahamadiyah, an unorthodox Muslim sect. These attacks 
made international headlines in February 2011, when some 
1,500 people attacked a small group of members of Ahma-
diyah and killed three of them. Whilst these attacks were 
publicly condemned by many politicians, intellectuals, and 
religious authorities, who all made public statements in fa-
vour of religious tolerance, the state apparatus has usually 
responded by limiting Ahmadiyah’s public activities to 
safeguard public order (Olle 2009, 114). For example, when 
members of the Front Pembela Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and 
other radical groups attacked a demonstration organized 
by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith 
for its support of Ahmadiyah, the Department of Home 
Affairs and the Department of Religion issued a joint de-
cree consisting mainly of warnings to followers of Ahma-
diyah not to promote deviant teachings, while at the same 
time prohibiting vigilantism. The inaction of the govern-
ment, the law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary in 
condemning the violence, preventing attacks, and bringing 
perpetrators to justice has been accompanied by a growing 
number of provincial and local regulations that limit, or at 
times even de facto ban, the activities of Ahmadiyah 
(Crouch 2011). Government reaction to the violent attacks 
of February 2011 on Ahmadiyah members and supporters 
was also lukewarm. While some of the perpetrators were 
actually tried and convicted, the sentences of a few months 
in prison were nowhere near the maximum of twelve 
years.10 What is more, a ministerial decree issued in 2008, 
which banned Ahmadiyah followers from expressing their 
religious beliefs publicly, actually provided the legal back-
ground for nationwide discrimination and violent attacks 
(Heiduk 2008).
The resurgence of Islamist militias has, however, by and 
large been overshadowed by the existence of the Jemaah Is-
lamiyah terror network. While until 2009 their attacks were 
aimed mainly at Western nightclubs, embassies, and luxury 
hotels, Indonesian officials and government institutions 
have increasingly become targets. This was most spectacu-
larly exemplified by a failed plot to assassinate President 
Yudhoyono in 2009, but also by various attacks on police 
officers in 2011.11 Threatened by attacks against state offi-
cials and institutions, the Indonesian government has in 
turn made significant efforts to crack down on terrorist 
networks operating in the country. In 2010 for example, a 
jihadist training camp in Aceh became the target of a police 
crackdown that left eight rebels dead, amongst them the al-
leged mastermind of the Bali bombings. Following the 
crackdown in Aceh, President Yudhoyono decreed the es-
tablishment of a National Anti-Terrorism Agency to coor-
dinate the efforts of different government agencies 
involved in anti-terrorism. Overall, the increased counter-
terrorism efforts vis-a-vis jihadist networks since 2005 have 
resulted in the arrest of over two hundred militants as-
sociated with Jemaah Islamiyah as well as the police killings 
of JI splinter group leaders Mohammad Noordin Top and 
Dulmatin in 2009 and 2010 respectively.
8 Cable 06JAKARTA5851, Wikileaks.com, August 
30, 2011, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06JAK-
ARTA5851.html#. 
9 “Police Deny Relations with FPI Following 
Wikileaks release,” Jakarta Post (online), September 
4, 2011, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2011/09/04/police-deny-relations-with-fpi-fol-
lowing-wikileaks-release.html.
10 “Sentences in Indonesian Killings Draw Criti-
cism,” Wall Street Journal (online), July 28, 2011; 
“Indonesia: A bad year for religious rights,” Jakarta 
Globe (online), December 26, 2011.
11 “Terror in 2011: Major Attacks, Players and Lo-
cations”, Jakarta Globe (online), December 26, 2011.
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Apart from the state’s ambiguous relationship with “un-
civil society” (Hefner), another striking feature of the re-
surgence of political Islam in Indonesia is the remarkable 
rise since 1998 of the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – 
Prosperous Justice Party) inspired by the Muslim Brother-
hood. After gaining less than 2 percent of the votes in In-
donesia’s first free and fair elections in 1999, the PKS 
managed to win more than 7 percent in 2004 and 2009. As 
a result, it became Indonesia’s seventh-strongest political 
party and joined the ruling coalition of President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. The PKS even saw its leader, Hidiyat 
Nur Wahid, chosen as speaker of the Indonesian parlia-
ment. Analysis of the 2004 elections shows that PKS won 
many votes through its somewhat secular agenda (de-
manding reform of the welfare system and pushing for 
stronger anti-corruption policies). It differed from other 
Islamist groups by not openly demanding the establish-
ment of sharia law and mainly concentrating on to govern-
ance issues. Furthermore, the cadre-based organizational 
structures of the PKS, which were modeled on Egypt’s 
Muslim Bortherhood, and the party’s internal disciplinary 
system not only ensured that the majority of its members 
abide by to the party’s programme and refrain from ac-
tivities that could be detrimental to the PKS’s image, such 
as conducting or supporting violent actions, but have at 
the same time served as a “preventive radicalisation mech-
anism.” Noor argues that it is “this internal mechanism 
that PKS hopes to use in order to maintain the cohesion of 
its membership and to distance itself from the more radical 
and violent Islamist groups in Indonesia today” (2011, 26).
It seems obvious that Indonesia’s democratization has 
opened up space for a great variety of Islamist actors, which 
have in turn further enhanced the general political import-
ance of Islam. Democratization encompassed the establish-
ment of a multiparty system, the lifting of restrictions on 
the freedom of press, and an enormous decentralization 
process that has allowed Islamists to spread their ideas 
legally through extensive communication networks. It also 
enabled the Islamist parties to return to the political arena. 
The lifting of repression of oppositional groups permitted 
the establishment of various Islamic civil society organiz-
ations, including moderate, liberal organizations, but also 
the “uncivil society.” While post-Suharto Indonesia cer-
tainly disproves the hypothesis that democratic institutions 
automatically lead to Islamist moderation, the devel-
opments also challenge the assumption that there is a clear 
dividing line between Islamists and the state’s authorities. 
While the latter appears to be true with regard to jihadist 
networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah and its splinter groups, 
which faced strong state repression, other militant Islamists 
such as Front Pembela Islam or Laskar Jihad have often op-
erated in a gray zone between repression and cooptation. 
The varying relationship between the state and militant Is-
lamist actors – ranging from (at least temporary) coop-
tation to repression – seems to emphasize how even parts 
of political Islam’s militant fringe can be instrumentalized 
by elites to serve their specific sociopolitical interests.
This picture is further complicated by the International Cri-
sis Group investigation into the killings of police officers in 
West Java in 2011, which found that the perpetrators of the 
bombings were not members of terrorist groups but had 
been radicalised in the context of the street politics of Is-
lamist militias. “The 2011 suicide bombings of a police 
mosque in Cirebon, West Java and an evangelical church in 
Solo, Central Java were carried out by men who moved 
from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding 
morality and curbing ‘deviance’ to using bombs and guns” 
(ICG 2012, 1). Similarly, a study on religious radicalism in 
Java by the Sentara Institute published before the 2011 at-
tacks found that radical Islamist groups in the area had 
served as “incubators” for the two suicide bombers involved 
in the attacks but that neither of the two had any links to 
known terrorist groups. Neither the Islamist actors nor the 
Indonesian state can be considered to be a “monolithic 
bloc”; rather, it is a stark characteristic of post-Suharto In-
donesia that the relationship between the state and Islamist 
actors has lost its cohesion. The ambivalent relationship be-
tween political elites and the “uncivil society”, as well as the 
rise of the PKS in the 2004 elections, again must be under-
stood within the wider context of Indonesia’s transition to 
what Hadiz terms “illiberal democracy” (2003).
3. Contextualizing Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia:  
The Oligarchic Continuum 
The aforementioned positive reviews of the democratiz-
ation process that brought about Indonesia‘s transition to 
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democracy and the end of the New Order focus mainly on 
factors such as elite choices, leadership, and the importance 
of political institutions to the course and outcome of the 
democratization process (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). 
Accordingly, the crafting of democratic rules and in-
stitutions, combined with democratic forms of governance 
and the existence of an enlightened, pro-democratic civil 
society serving as a “watchdog” to the government, is 
equated with the consolidation of democracy (Rieffel 
2004). While such new institutional arrangements may be 
pivotal for the establishment of a democratic political sys-
tem, they largely exclude the constellations of social forces 
(or classes) that “determine the parameters of possible out-
comes in any given situation. … The direction of political 
change following the end of authoritarian rule is primarily 
the product of contests between these competing social 
forces” (Hadiz 2003, 592). Bellin points out that social 
forces are therefore by and large “contingent, not con-
sistent, democrats” (2000) – that is, support for democracy 
or the authoritarian state depends on whether these spe-
cific social forces see their political and economic interests 
served by the respective form of rule. When political and 
economic conditions change, interests may change, too. 
Thus social forces might see the need to redefine their posi-
tion toward the respective regime (Bellin 2000).
The change in political and economic conditions in In-
donesia was brought about by the Asian financial crisis in 
1997. With the New Order descending into deep economic 
crisis, more than one third of the population slid under the 
poverty line, living standards of large parts of the popu-
lation declined, and economic growth rates fell to less than 
zero. Once legitimized by high economic growth rates and 
rising living standards, the New Order regime, personalized 
by Suharto, who was often referred to as Pak Pembangunan 
(father of development), saw itself confronted with politi-
cal and economic crisis. As Suharto proved incapable of 
solving the crisis and hundreds of thousands demanded re-
forms, supporters withdrew their loyalty and forced him to 
step down (Smith 2003).
The fall of Suharto and the institutional reforms that fol-
lowed are not to be equated with the establishment of 
democracy and a “free” market economy. Yet they did 
change the “balance of power” and the “terms of conflict” 
(Robinson 2001, 120), as the formerly dominant political/
business oligarchs and bureaucrats lost the powerful cen-
tralized state apparatus that had guaranteed their 
privileged positions and secured their interests. A new and 
more open political system came into being, one in which 
politics was no longer channeled exclusively vertically 
through the state apparatus and Suharto’s cronies, but in-
creasingly through parties and the parliament. The “dif-
fusion of politics” after the fall of Suharto made it 
necessary for the old power-holders to adapt to the politics 
of reform and consequently to engage in wider and more 
horizontal alliances in order to protect their own resources 
of political and economic power (Slater 2006, 208). A coali-
tion of moderate reformers and old elites under the leader-
ship of Suharto’s deputy Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie took 
power and initiated moderate democratic political reforms 
– effectively marginalizing those social forces that had de-
manded more radical reforms. At the same time, the system 
of collusion, corruption, and nepotism amongst officials 
and politico-business oligarchs did not cease to exist. The 
de facto elimination of any mass-based opposition during 
the New Order era meant that there were no simply social 
forces strong enough to break up the old power structures.
Therefore, while political institutions were widely reform-
ed, the socioeconomic power structures of the New Order 
(the vast, informal patronage networks of the elites) re-
mained largely unaffected throughout this “quasi-evol-
utionary” elite-driven transition process. The result was 
what Slater calls the construction of a “political cartel” 
(2004). Although elections are formally competitive, the 
cartel of political elites protects those in power from out-
side competition. Slater argues that the political cartel has 
made Indonesia’s oligarchy “practically irremovable 
through the electoral process, even though elections them-
selves have been commendably free and fair” (2006, 208).
The “money politics” is fueled by a party system in which 
political parties have not emerged out of “broad-based so-
cial interests” with the backing of different, often competing 
social forces (which was precluded by the elite-controlled 
transition process) but exist instead mainly as “patronage 
machines” of elite factions. This has also been described as a 
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 26 – 40
Felix Heiduk: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia 36
“trend toward personality-based political parties in recent 
years.”12 Striking examples for this type of political party 
are the Democrat Party led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyo-
no), the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra, led by 
ex-General Prabowo Subianto) and the People’s Conscience 
Party (Partai Hanura, led by ex-General Wiranto). The 
“commodification of politics” (Ufen 2010, 30) has various 
dimensions. First, the mobilization of voters, which often 
begins months ahead of the actual campaigning periods, in-
volves spiraling costs for the candidates in terms of ad-
vertisements and marketing. These costs are often at least 
partially shouldered by business elites backing one or some-
times even all candidates to ensure their interests are met by 
office-holders after the elections. Second, on the local level 
candidates need to bribe party bosses to secure slots on 
their party’s lists. So, money politics also affect the internal 
process by which a political party designates its candidates. 
In order to ensure that candidates have at least some sup-
port, they officially have to be put forward by parties. In 
reality candidates start campaigning before they have the 
support of a political party, and later seek support from any 
party, regardless of ideals or platforms. “Parties were a ‘ve-
hicle’ minus ideology” (Simandjuntak 2009, 93).
One example is the backing of former deputy governor 
Fauzi Bowo by the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P) during the 2007 local elections in Jakarta. 
This decision, which was made only weeks before the elec-
tions, came as a surprise to the PDI-P party chapters and 
the public, as Bowo had previously been registered with 
former Suharto party Golkar. Despite his lack of roots 
within his new party, and although other candidates had 
already been selected, Bowo was immediately given a 
chance to register as an independent candidate for PDI-P. 
Disappointed party members as well as political analysts 
described this as a “political ploy played by the elite,” 
which holds the tickets to enter the race for lucrative and 
sought-after posts within the local and national govern-
ment. These tickets are usually sold to the highest bidder, 
which effectively marginalizes democratic decision-making 
processes within the parties (Sabarini 2007a). In line with 
this, Buehler and Tan show that the relationship between 
party and candidate is formed at a later stage, on an ad-hoc 
basis shortly before the elections, and often based on per-
sonal bonds not political bonds (2007). Virtually all local 
candidates had no roots in any party and originated from 
outside the parties. “The parties expected to be paid by 
candidates for their services in the elections” (Buehler and 
Tan 2007, 65). Thirdly, trying to ensure a good ticket for 
posts after the elections also involves the “mobilization of 
delegates as voters at party congresses through campaig-
ning and different forms of vote-buying” (Ufen 2010, 30). 
In a country where, according to the World Bank definition 
of less than $2 per day, more than 50 percent of the popu-
lation continues to live below the poverty line, the practice 
of money politics severely restricts political decision-mak-
ing to competing wealthy elite factions (Hillman 2006, 27).
Vote-buying is common in all districts of Indonesia, with 
more than seven thousand election violations, including 
multiple vote-buying incidents, reported during the 2004 
parliamentary elections. During the 2004 presidential elec-
tions the NGOs Indonesian Corruption Watch and Trans-
parency International Indonesia suspected nearly all 
presidential candidates of vote-buying. Australian journal-
ist Michael Backmann was left wondering whether cor-
ruption runs so rampant as to completely undermine 
democracy (2004):
Democracy is a good thing. But what is the point of it when the 
state apparatus is so corrupt that most laws are subverted to the 
point of irrelevancy? Who cares whether this or that leader is 
elected when corruption will mean that their policy platforms 
are unlikely to be implemented, and certainly not in the way that 
they would intend?
Indonesia is today still among the thirty most corrupt 
nations according to Transparency International’s annual 
Corruption Index. A survey conducted by Gallup right be-
fore the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections 
showed that nine out of ten Indonesians perceive corruption 
12 Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012, 
Country Report Indonesia, http://www.bti-project.
de/laendergutachten/aso/idn/2012/#chap4.
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to be endemic throughout government surveyed. Moreover, 
52 percent believe that corruption actually became worse 
between 2004 and 2009 (Gallup 2008). Corruption is so en-
demic, that 85 percent of judges and 60 percent of police of-
ficers are estimated to be corrupt (Webber 2006, 408) and 
companies working in Indonesia are reckoned to use about 
10 percent of their overall budgets to “smoothen” business 
operations (Henderson and Kuncoro 2004).
While collusion and nepotism under the New Order were 
largely channeled through Suharto’s patronage networks, 
today the democratic political parties serve as patronage 
vehicles for Indonesia’s “new” elites. Thus Robinson and 
Hadiz describe Indonesia’s transition process as the “oli-
garchization” of democracy (2004). Within the democratic 
oligarchy, as opposed to the authoritarian New Order of 
Suharto, the once extremely centralized state apparatus has 
lost its cohesion. It must therefore be understood not as a 
monolithic bloc, but rather as a focal point of competing 
social forces. The deployment of Islamist militias serving as 
instruments in the hands of competing elite factions and 
the success of the Islamist PKS must be understood against 
this background. Against what many Indonesians perceive 
as the “old,” ineffective, and corrupt political establish-
ment, the PKS presented itself as an “anti-establishment” 
party with a political agenda focusing mainly on anti-cor-
ruption policies and socioeconomic reforms. The success 
of its “clean and caring” message during the 2004 and 2009 
elections was a product of the many shortcomings of the 
“new” democratic order.
4. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam Ten Years after Reformasi 
The foregoing analysis of the substance of democracy and 
the realities of “democratic” practices in post-Suharto In-
donesia identifies a widening gap between the formal as-
pects of democracy (such as free elections, democratic 
institutions) and the democratic rhetoric of elected elites 
on the one hand, and the realities on the ground. The 
growing political importance of radical Islam in Indonesia 
must be interpreted as a response to this gap. The oligar-
chic continuum has triggered different responses from dif-
ferent strands of radical Islam, which have in turn resulted 
in different policies adopted by the Indonesian state to-
wards the respective groups. Transnational jihadist net-
works like Jemaah Islamiyah and their followers have 
quickly come to regard the new Indonesia as more of the 
same secularism that they despise as sinful (though for-
mally more democratic). Terrorist acts carried out to estab-
lish an Islamic state have been met with increasingly 
successful counter-terrorism measures by the Indonesian 
state. Whilst Islamist militants waging jihad as part of a 
struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia have faced in-
creasing repression by the Indonesian state and as a result 
have been weakened over the years, local Islamist militias 
like Front Pembela Islam and their “anti-vice” politics have 
been tolerated or in various incidents even actively sup-
ported by and used as a tool for political elites. Islamist 
vigilante groups have carried out with impunity a variety 
of militant actions against what they perceive as a “Chris-
tianization” of Indonesia and for the application of the 
sharia in public life. This is first of all because these mil-
itias, unlike Jemaah Islamiyah, accept the Indonesian gov-
ernment as legitimate in principle, and do not actively 
strive to establish an Islamic state in its place. In addition, 
nearly all political parties (as well as other private actors) 
employ “their” respective private militias for protection 
and to intimidate opponents. Hence political support in 
Jakarta for imposing a ban on militias is low. With new 
studies highlighting the blurring divisions between Islamist 
militias and terrorists, a wider question emerges: Is it poss-
ible to differentiate between radical Islamist militias and ji-
hadist terrorism? One preliminary conclusion, based on 
present research on the attacks in West Java, could be that 
jihadi ideologies and tactics have merged with the agendas 
of vigilante groups, thus establishing “individual jihadists” 
or “self-made terrorists” with no connections to larger ter-
rorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah as a new variant in 
Indonesia’s spectrum of radical Islamists.
And then there is the moderate strand of radical Islam. Is-
lamist parties, especially the PKS, have employed a “clean 
and caring” message in response to what especially the 
urban middle class perceives to be but the continuation in 
a democratic institutional framework of the old patterns of 
collusion, nepotism, and corruption that dominated In-
donesian politics for decades. Within this context, the PKS 
managed to mobilize the votes of many disappointed 
members of the middle class through its commitment to 
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clean government and social reforms. Because of its success 
in the 2004 national elections the PKS even became part of 
the coalition led by President Yudhoyono. But realpolitik 
has caused the PKS some serious setbacks over the last few 
years. By being a part of the Yudhoyono government, the 
party had to carry some of the responsibility for “tough” 
policies such as the cuts on fuel subsidies. More damage to 
the party’s “clean and caring” image was done through 
corruption charges against PKS members serving in re-
gional governments. Ironically, the PKS was unable to suc-
cessfully transform the “clean and caring” campaign that 
gained it many votes during the 2004 elections into real-
politik under the Yudhoyono government, and thus cur-
rently finds itself in a state of decline. Thus while Islamist 
parties like the PKS managed to gain electoral success with 
an agenda focused on governance issues, it has been dif-
ficult for them to deliver on those promises. Accordingly, 
the party failed to gain more than 7.9 percent of the votes 
in the 2009 national elections. Opinion polls seem to pro-
vide further evidence for this development, recently show-
ing flagging support for Islamist parties in general. 
Moreover, in a society that has been in a process of Islamiz-
ation for nearly two decades, attempts to gain political 
legitimacy through moral, faith-based politics are not the 
sole domain of the PKS. Local sharia laws for example are 
increasingly supported by “normal” Muslim and even 
“secular” parties such as Golkar in order to boost their 
political legitimacy amongst their constituents (Buehler 
2011). Therefore Tanuwidjaja argues that the decline of Is-
lamist parties in post-Suharto Indonesia is not to be equat-
ed with a crisis of political Islam (2010). Instead, he argues, 
Islam has penetrated all political parties to an extent that 
makes it hard for Islamic parties to monopolize Islamic as-
pirations of their constituents. The fact that all major 
political parties have accommodated Islamic aspirations 
can be interpreted as a victory of radical Islamists in a 
formerly “secular” political environment.
Hence, it would be wrong to conclude that the recent 
weakening of political Islam in Indonesia is irreversible. 
The continuum of predatory interests, graft-ridden politi-
cal institutions, rampant poverty, and unemployment still 
– despite high economic growth rates – makes political 
Islam seem a credible alternative to many. While these find-
ings certainly do not link up directly with the individual 
motivations of radical Islamists to engage in violence, in-
terviews with jailed militants show that perceived in-
equality and perceived corruption often served as a 
justification for Islamist violence. Especially endemic cor-
ruption has contributed to “the negative impression that 
the government is immoral and thogut (evil)” (Ungerer 
2011, 11). The oligarchic character of Indonesia’s democ-
racy has to a large extent minimized the positive effects of 
moderate Islamist parties. The real challenge for Indone-
sia’s democracy is therefore not political Islam per se, but 
rather the appropriation of the democratization process by 
the power politics of predatory elites. This, combined with 
an ongoing Islamization of society in general, has further 
complicated the aforementioned ambiguous relationship 
between the state and radical Islam. However, the (selec-
tive) instrumentalization of radical Islam by the state has 
also, much to the distaste of those in favor of the establish-
ment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, discredited it in the 
eyes of many Indonesians looking for a credible opposition 
force to what Webber terms Indonesia’s “patrimonial 
democracy” (2006).
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